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Abstract 
Trams are playing increasingly important role in today’s public transport systems, as they are punctual and friendly to the 
environment, in addition to high capacity compared to buses. But the normal function of this above-ground light rail system can be 
interrupted by unexpected events. This research adopts the disruption recovery approach used in Munich and Berlin, Germany – 
the best service acclaimed by the public, to examine the collaboration mechanism with a taxi company to provide fast recovery 
service during tram disruptions. Because of the spontaneous nature of disruptions, a proactive contract-based collaboration strategy 
is formulated. The two involving parties’ decision functions are developed and analyzed both individually and interactively as a 
game to generate the optimal solutions. Numerical sensitivity analysis of critical parameters are conducted to shed more lights on 
decision-making and implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
Public transport systems are becoming increasingly important as they are advantageous in reliability, capacity, 
accessibility and environmental friendliness. These benefits lead to the revival of trams in many regions of the world. 
However, this above-ground light-rail system is also prone to disruptions caused by various unexpected events such 
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as track misalignment, parking violations, power outages, and natural disasters, which can reduce tram provider’s 
desired service level and result in passengers’ inconvenience. This research stems from our study of how the tram 
systems in Berlin and Munich of Germany and Dalian of China handle unexpected disruptions. Our direct contacts 
with the operators of several tram systems have revealed that the tram operators’ acutest challenge is to respond to 
unplanned disruptions in real time with quick recovery decisions. The short-term, unplanned disruptions refer to those 
interrupted tram services caused by unexpected events, and the associated breakdowns can be diagnosed and solved 
fairly quickly, and may not last very long (e.g., for a period of one hour).  
It is noticed that since 2009 and 2010, the Munich and Berlin tram company have been working with a local taxi 
provider to ensure faster tram replacement service. Using taxis instead of buses for recovery service enables a 
shortened recovery time and shifts the pressure and burden from the tram system’s control center, enabling the latter 
to concentrate on recovering the system. Our previous study (Zeng et al., 2012) documents the details of the recovery 
method and procedure used by Munich tram system and focuses on when and how to collaborate with the taxi company. 
However in reality, failures do exist as well if the taxi company runs into resource limit. For example, the Berlin tram 
system (BVG) did not achieve the desired recovery service during their first attempted collaboration with the taxi 
company because a well-known trade show took place that same day and the taxi service was tied up at the fair 
(Berliner Morgenpost, 2010).Consequently, a pre-determined reserved quantity of taxis prior to the breakdown of the 
tram system can be specified in the contract to ensure available resources for the recovery effort. As a result, how to 
determine the reservation capacity? What if the reserved capacity cannot meet the need? How should the two parties 
interact to achieve agreed-upon terms for capacity and compensation? This paper aims to address these questions.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to literature review that is divided into 
two streams of previous works related to our study. Section 3 and 4 present the contract models and preliminary results. 
Section 5 contains a series of numerical examples and sensitivity analyses to put theoretical results into perspectives 
and generate more insights. Finally, concluding remarks, summary of the findings, and future research extensions are 
provided in Section 6.   
2. Literature Review 
Disruption management aims at coping with unexpected events to mitigate the effect of disruption in real-time 
(Clausen et al., 2001; Yu and Qi, 2004). Most of the research pertinent to this subject can be found in the literature of 
airline industry operations, production planning, supply chain and logistics, project management, and transportation 
system design. In what follows, we divide the relevant literature into two streams: (1) disruption management in public 
transport systems; and (2) collaborations through contracts in transportation systems.  
2.1Disruption Management in Public Transport Systems 
There are many research results on disruption management in public transport systems, especially for the railway 
systems at both tactical and operational levels. Generally speaking, the focus of disruption management is to deal with 
the following three problems arising in railway disruption management: (1) “timetable adjustment” (e.g. D’Ariano 
and Pranzo, 2009, and Corman et al., 2010), which looks at how to adjust timetables of public trains during disrupted 
situations in response to break downs of operating vehicles; (2)“rolling stock” (e.g. Jespersen-Groth et al., 2009), 
which is concerned about vehicle capacity in the occurrence of unexpected events; and (3) “crew re-scheduling” (e.g. 
Freling et al., 2004), which deals with human labor capacity and utilization during disruptions.   
One of the existing research streams is concentrated on evaluating pre-event disruption handling ability. For 
example, Adreinlewo (2009) studied the impacts of the transportation network size on the level of performance during 
disruptions. The study was conducted using the graph theory based on observations of systems comprising various 
critical infrastructural components. Klahn (2004) documented the impacts of track work on train systems in Germany. 
A planning tool called BauplanPlus was then developed to quantify the effects by simulating various disruptions. The 
study by Clausen (2007) examines the applicability of commercial IT-systems and mathematical models to disruption 
recovery planning for airline and railway industries. 
1339 Yan Fang and Amy Z. Zeng /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1337 – 1346 
2.2 Collaborations in Transport Systems 
Collaboration as an important mechanism in transport system disruption management has received attention from 
both practical and academic communities in recent years. Interestingly, we have found that researches on this topic in 
European countries and Australia are especially active. We herein summarize three recent representative studies. First 
of all, Westerlund and Cazemier (2007) presented several cases about how the public transport systems in Sweden 
and the Netherlands collaborate with taxi companies to provide Demand Responsive Transport (DRT) services. 
Several procurement models for contracting with private operators to assure high-level service are described. The 
study further reported that about half of the taxi industry’s revenue comes from contract work in Sweden and about 
60 percent in the Netherlands. This study provides not only one more application of taxis in public transport systems 
during special occasions, but also a successful example of the role contract plays in transport disruption management. 
Secondly, García et al. (2009) observed an on-line optimization model and a fast heuristic algorithm were proposed 
to support real-time decisions on how to help a public transport line that has a sudden demand surge exceeding its 
capacity. The third example is given by Darmanin et al. (2010), where a new disruption recovery strategy for commuter 
rails in Melbourne – using existing route buses as alternative vehicles to charter buses is presented. The study points 
out that the key deficiency of charter buses is their slow response time and deployment, and that new uncertainties 
caused by using charter buses can be introduced to the existing bus transport system.   
There is no doubt that using contracted taxi capacity ensures a certain level of resource availability to deal with 
unexpected, short-term disruptions; however, this collaboration strategy is not fully explored yet, because the 
challenges lie in the areas of measuring costs and benefits of collaborating with a second party for service recovery, 
the passengers’ behaviors and perceptions, and the available transport capacity of the second party – to name just a 
few. Our research aims to bridge the gaps in current literature by providing a set of models that take these factors into 
consideration. The findings of this study will provide a foundation for developing future long-term decision-support 
systems and procedures for public tram disruption management. 
3. Modeling the Contract   
In this paper we consider the situation where a tram company collaborates with a taxi company as a means to 
provide fast recovery service to deal with short-term tram disruptions. The occurrence of a disruption during a day– 
either rush hour or ordinary hour, is recognized, and the two companies could established a the contract specifies a 
predetermined quantity of reserved taxis that are guaranteed to arrive within a specified time period upon request. We 
can see that having a contract in place ensures a certain level of taxi capacity upon request. However, the contract 
does not come free and poses challenges for both companies. Specifically, from the tram company’s perspective, the 
reservation fee will be incurred for sure but the degree of vehicle utilization is uncertain. From the standpoint of the 
taxi company, the biggest issue is to guarantee the taxis under reservation to arrive at disruption spot within specified 
time frame, which requires significant amount of scheduling, dispatching, communication and coordination effort, 
which may incur high costs. In summary, the tram company needs to balance between the recovery costs and the 
passenger service, whereas the taxi control center must weigh the compensations of recovery services against the costs 
of arranging needed number of taxis.  
3.1. Description of the Decision-making Problem under Study  
It is not difficult to see that everyone needs to decide on whether to wait for the tram replacement service or to 
leave – some people are willing to wait longer, others maybe in a hurry or already close to their destination and 
therefore decide to walk or switch to other transport mode. These different behavioral patterns are clearly dependent 
upon the arrival time of the taxis. Intuitively, the faster the taxis can arrive, the higher portion of passengers that will 
be willing to wait for the recovery service, which ultimately will help the tram company maintain the desired level of 
customer satisfaction and the company’s goodwill.   
 Similar to our previous study (Zeng et al., 2012), we rely on the difference between the complete and partial 
passenger losses – referred as “reduced loss”, as the basis to analyze the tram company’s decisions. Regarding the 
payment method for taxi service, we propose (1) a fixed per-vehicle reservation rate paid to the taxi company to 
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guarantee the number of taxis to arrive at disruption site; and (2) service time based payment with a fixed per-unit 
time rate for the number of taxis that are actually in service during a disruption.   
The biggest challenge for the taxi company is to arrange the contracted number of taxis on a short notice by the 
desired time frame, and the taxis’ arrival times are only meaningful if they are much shorter than the disruption 
duration. We will quantify the taxi company’s effort and expense by a nonlinear cost function in this paper.   
3.2. Notation and Assumptions  
There are three time-related parameters. The first two are input parameters whose values can be estimated at the 
time of disruption: (1) td : the average duration of a disruption; and (2) ts : the average round-trip service time for each 
taxi. Note that since the disruption duration is short (around an hour), it is reasonable to assume that each taxi will 
make only one round trip. (3)The last parameter, ta , is the average time it takes for all the taxis to arrive at the disruption 
site, and is treated as a decision variable. We consider one contract period (e.g., one year) in this research and assume 
that the average numbers of disruptions during rush hours and ordinary hours are known based on historical data.   
The reservation fee, Pr, paid by the tram company to keep nr taxis to arrive at the disruption place, is calculated 
as  (1), where k0  is the tram company’s unit reservation fee ($/vehicle):  
rrr nknP 0=)(        (1)  
The taxi company’s stand-by cost will increase with the number of reserved vehicles for it becomes harder to 
guarantee on-time service delivery with higher reservation capacity. We assume that the stand-by cost for nr taxis 
follows a geometric progression series: k1, k1(1+θ), k1(1+θ)2,..., 1-1 )+1( rnθk , where k1 is the stand-by cost for the first 
taxi. The geometric summation formula leads to the total cost of keeping nr taxis standby as follows:  
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Similar to our previous study (Zeng et al., 2012), we consider aggregate passengers’ behavior rather than each 
individual’s reaction during a disruption. The aggregate passengers’ willingness to wait, w(ta), is assumed to decrease 
linearly as the average taxi’s arrival time (ta) increases and can be computed in (3).   
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Other notation and symbols used throughout the paper are given below: 
N: Average number of disruptions during one contract period;  
λ : Percentage of disruptions during rush hours; hence (1- λ ) is the percentage of disruptions during ordinary hours;  
Prush:  Average passenger volume in a disruption during rush hours;  
Pord:  Average passenger volume in a disruption during ordinary hours;  
ct: Cost of taxi service per unit time ($/unit time); c: The capacity of each taxi;  
α : The passenger’s average lowest level of willingness to wait for the taxi service during a disruption, 0 < α < 1;  
cl: The tram company’s loss from each passenger that is not served or cannot wait, and can be regarded as a 
combination of goodwill loss, ticket refund, and others;  
td: The average duration of a typical disruption; 
ts: The taxi’s service time from the disruption site to the next tram station;  
ta: The average taxi arrival time agreed by both the tram and taxi companies in the contract;  
nr: The number of taxis reserved to arrive at the disruption site within tr, a decision variable;  
p0: The tram company’s recovery service payment rate ($/unit time) for reserved taxis;  
k0 : The tram company’s unit taxi reservation payment;  
k1:  The scale factor of the taxi company’s stand-by cost series;  
θ : Common ratio of the taxi company’s stand-by cost series.   
3.3. The Decision Functions under Contract  
We firstly derive the decision functions under contract for the tram and taxi companies. The contract-based 
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collaboration provides additional business opportunity for the taxi company while incurring new costs. As such, the 
taxi company’s average recovery service profit function during a contract period, Πtx (nr ) , has the following 
expression:  
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where the first term is the reservation payment after stand-by cost and the second term is the total variable profit 
for providing recovery service during rush and ordinary hours over the contract period. Note that any term related to 
the taxi’ company will be denoted by “x” in the following sections. Furthermore, the number of taxis in service during 
rush hours, nr_rush, and ordinary hours, nr_ord , is defined below, respectively:  
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Equations (7) and (8) calculate the actual quantity of taxis needed during rush hours and ordinary hours, 
respectively, and it is reasonable to assume that ordrush nn > . Both (5) and (6) recognize the difference between the 
reserved number of taxis in the contract (nr) and the actual taxi usage; for example, as shown in Figure 1, if a disruption 
occurs during rush hours, the reserved capacity may or may not be equal to the actual demand; if the reserved (nr) is 
smaller, there will be only nr vehicles available to dispatch; otherwise, the actual demand (nrush) can be satisfied. 
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Figure 1. Number of Reserved Taxis vs. Actual Taxi Demand 
We now look at the tram company’s decision function – reduced loss, which is defined as the difference between 
the loss of doing nothing during a disruption and the partial loss by contracting with the taxi company for recovery 
service. It is seen that the higher the reduced loss, the better. The tram company’s average reduced loss per contract 
period, Otm (nr ), after grouping, can be written in Eq. (9). Note that the subscript, “m”, is designated to denote all the 
terms related to the tram company.  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In Eq. (9), the first two terms compute the respective partial loss under contracted replacement service during rush 
and ordinary hours per contract period, and the last term is the total reservation fee. Again, nr_rush  and nr_ord  are 
defined in Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively.   
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4. The Optimal Solutions 
4.1 The Taxi Company’s Optimal Solution, *rxn  
The taxi company’s average recovery service profit per contract period is given in Eq. (4), based on which the 
optimal solution is derived, and the associated results are summarized in the following statement. By checking the 
first and second derivative of (4), we could get the following optimal solution for the taxi company. 
Proposition 1: The optimal number of reserved taxis from the standpoint of the taxi company, *rxn , is found from 
the following procedure: 
Step 1: Check to see if the following condition is met; if yes, then 0=*rxn ; otherwise, go to Step 2; 
  100 /)()1(
)1ln( ktcpNk st!

TT
T . 
Step 2: Check to see if the following condition is met (where nrush is given in (7)); if yes, then rushrx nn =
* ; 
otherwise, go to Step 3; 
( ) 100
1
/)-(+<
)+1(
)+1ln()+1(
ktcpNλkθθ
θθ
st
nrush
 
Step 3: Compute the following two parameters:                 
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(1) If ordrxrx nnn İİ * 1* 2 <0  , or ordrxrx nnn İ* 1* 2 <<0 , then * 1* = rxrx nn ; 
(2) If rushrxordrx nnnn İİ * 1* 2 <<0 , then ordrx nn =* ; 
(3) If rushrxrxord nnnn İ
*
1
*
2 <<  or 
*
1
*
2 << rxrushrxord nnnn İ , then 2* = rxrx nn . 
4.2 The Tram Company’s Optimal Solution, *rmn  
The tram company’s average reduced loss per contract period is given in (7). The first-order derivative of (7) is 
found to be a constant because: 
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As a result, the optimal solution is one of the endpoints. A comparison of the values of (9) at the two extreme 
points (nord, nrush) will reveal the optimal solution; that is, the tram company’s optimal number of reserved taxis, *rmn , 
should satisfy the following condition: 
{ })(),(max=* ordtmrushtmrm nOnOn
                                                  
(13) 
4.3 The Agreed-upon Taxi Reservation Capacity, 0rn  
It is highly possible that two parties’ optimal reservation capacities are not always identical. In the decision-
making situation under study, both tram and taxi companies strive to protect respective benefit while seeking 
negotiation to achieve an agreement. We make two rules regarding the negotiation process: 
Rule 1: The party with lower optimal solution value (marked as A) is the leader of the negotiation and that 
solution is the starting value for negotiation. For example, if ** < rmrx nn  is true, the taxi company will take the lead to 
determine the final reservation capacity and the negotiation begins with *rxn  , as the taxi company has the power to 
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state that they cannot provide more vehicles due to their capacity constraints.  
Rule 2: The party aiming to increase the reservation capacity (denoted as B) needs to compensate its counterpart’s 
marginal deviation of benefit. Obviously, once B’s marginal increase in benefit is higher than that of A’s marginal 
decrease, B will strive to negotiate with A to increase the taxi’s amount until the two companies’ marginal deviations 
become equal or approximately equal. 
Now designate 0rn  to represent the agreed-upon number of reserved taxis after negotiation. Details of the two 
possible scenarios of the negotiation process are discussed as follows. 
Scenario 1: The taxi company’s optimal solution is smaller, ** < rmrx nn  
Under this situation, the taxi company is the leader, and the negotiation begins with *rxn . The tram company 
would want to increase the reservation capacity only if the condition expressed in (14.a) is true. Eq. (14.a) essentially 
means the marginal value for the tram company is larger than the marginal value for the counterpart. It also implies 
that the tram company will add payment in order for the taxi company to increase the reservation capacity while there 
is still some benefit left after the increased compensation. Consequently, the final agreed-upon capacity, 0rn , must 
satisfy the condition in either  (14.b) or (14.c). The condition indicated by (14.b) implies that the marginal deviations 
of the two companies’ decision values as *rxn  increases to 
0
rn  become identical. If such an equilibrium does not exist, 
then as suggested by (14.c), the agreed-upon reservation capacity will be the tram company’s initial optimal solution, 
*
rmn . 
0)()1()()1( **** !3322 rxtxrxtxrxtmrxtm nnnn   (14.a) 
                                     0)(1)()(1)(
0000 d3322 rtxrtxrtmrtm nnnn                (14.b) 
  and 0)(1)()(1)( *0**** rmrrmtxrmtxrmtmrmtm nnnnnn  !3322    (14.c) 
Scenario 2: The tram company’s optimal solution is smaller, 
** > rmrx nn . Similarly, 
0
rn  could be achieved by (15) 
                    0)()1()()1(
**** !2233 rmtmrmtmrmtxrmtx nnnn                   (15.a) 
0)(1)()(1)( 0000 d2233 rtmrtmrtxrtx nnnn       (15.b) 
  and 0)(1)()(1)( *0**** rxrrxtmrxtmrxtxrxtx nnnnnn  !2233      (15.c) 
5. Numerical and Sensitivity Analysis 
To illustrate the results discussed in the previous section and understand the impacts of the input parameters on 
the two parties’ decisions and agreement, we conduct a series of numerical experiments. The base values of the input 
parameters are chosen as follows:  
c = 4; k1 = 250; k0 = 300; ߠ = 0.1; λ = 0.6; N = 50; p0 = 2; ct = 1; ts = 22; 
Prush = 100; Pord = 40; cl = 15; D= 0.4; ta = 10; td = 60. 
Figure 2 plots the tram company’s reduced loss value per contract period and the taxi company’s recovery service 
profit per contract period under the base values of the input parameters. It is clearly seen that both companies’ decision 
functions are continuous and concave with respect to the reservation capacity (nr). Moreover, the optimal reservation 
capacity is 15 for the taxi company and 23 for the tram company (i.e., ** < rmrx nn ). According to the two rules and 
Scenario 1 discussed in Section 4.3, the taxi company will take the lead in negotiation and the starting reservation 
capacity is 15. Using Eq. (14.a), we find that the marginal increase of the tram company’s reduced loss is $180, while 
the taxi company’s marginal decrease is $84. Thus, the tram company would want to increase the capacity to 16 and 
compensate the taxi company for $84 while still having $96 left as the benefit. At the capacity of 16, the two companies’ 
new marginal values are found as $180 and $184 respectively. According to (14.b), we can stop as the two marginal 
values are close, and the agreed-upon reservation capacity is thus 16. 
Clearly a range of parameters in this decision-making situation may impact the final solutions individually or 
jointly, and thus are of great interest for sensitivity analysis. In what follows, we examine and present the effects of 
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five individual parameters and two pairs of parameters on the decisions through numerical examples. In all the 
following exhibitions, NF = Negotiation Fee between the two companies calculated based on Eqs. (14) or (15); “TX” 
refers to the taxi company’s recovery service profit under final agreement, and “TM” presents the tram company’s 
reduced loss under final agreement. 
 
Figure 2. An Example Scenario of Decisions and Equilibrium 
Case 1: The Impact of D(The average passenger’s lowest level of willingness to wait)
The values of D are varied from 0.3 to 0.8 at increment of 0.1 each time while the two companies’ optimal 
solutions and decision values as well as the final agreement are calculated. The results in Table 1 demonstrate that the 
final agreement is not sensitive to the passengers’ lowest level of willingness to wait, which can be a valuable piece 
of information for the tram company to make decisions. 
Table 1. The Individual Impact of D on the Decisions 
D *rxn  *rmn  )(Π strrx n  )(Ο strrm n  0rn  NF TX TM 
0.3 15 22 10,344 5,527 16 84 10,344 5,623 
0.4 15 23 10,417 5,580 16 84 10,417 5,676 
0.5 15 23 10,490 5,633 16 84 10,490 5,729 
0.6 15 23 10,564 5,687 16 84 10,564 5,783 
0.7 15 24 10,637 5,740 16 84 10,637 5,836 
0.8 15 24 10,710 5,793 16 84 10,710 5,889 
Case 2: The Impact of λ  (Percentage of disruptions occurred during rush hours)
In this case, the values of λ  are varied from 0.2 to 0.7 with 0.1 increments each time. Due to the limitation of 
length, we just list the major implications: (1) the tram company’s optimal solution is largely dependent uponO ; that 
is, the more disruptions happen during rush hours, the larger number of reserved taxis. And (2) the tram company’s 
optimal solution increases much more rapidly than does the taxi company’s optimum as more disruptions occur during 
rush hours over the contract period. 
Case 3: The Impact of N (Average number of disruptions during one contract period) 
The number of disruptions increases from 20 to 200 at increment of 20 in this experiment and we find a very 
interesting pattern, which indicates that once N > 140, both companies’ optimal solutions will be identical. 
Furthermore, as the disruption frequency increases, the collaboration will create more benefits for both companies. 
Case 4: The Impact of td (The average duration of a typical disruption) 
In this example, the average disruption duration, td, increases from 30 to 100 at an interval of 10. The results 
reveal that the taxi company and the final agreement are not sensitive to this parameter and only the tram company’s 
optimal decision value increases steadily. This can be explained from the following two perspectives: (1) Since we 
assume that passengers’ willingness to wait decreases linearly to α  as the taxi’s average arrival time reaches dt , as dt  
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increases, the number of passengers to be served will grow, which requires more taxis; and (2) We only consider one 
round-trip for each taxi. In the real situation, some vehicles can make multiple trips. These limitations can be addressed 
in future studies.  
Case 5: The Joint Impact of the Tram Company’s Payment (k0, p0) 
This case compares the impacts of the tram company’s reservation rate for taxis (k0) and the service payment rate 
during each disruption (p0) on the decisions. We set k0 from 200 to 500 with an increment of 50 and choose three 
values for p0: 1.0, 2.0 and 2.4. The associated results summarized in Table 6 offer three important insights: (1) the two 
companies’ optimal solutions are more sensitive to the service payment rate, p0, than to the reservation rate, k0; (2) 
this experiment can help the tram company find an appropriate combination of the payment rates; (3) the pair 
determines whether the contract is beneficial or not; for example, the lower right corner of Table 2 such as (400, 2.4) 
and the left upper corner such as (250, 1.0) indicates the conditions under which the two companies would choose not 
to collaborate through the contract.  
Table 2: The Joint Impact of (k0, p0) on the Agreement 
 p0 = 1.0 p0 = 2.0 p0 = 2.4 
k0 *rxn  
*
rmn  
0
rn  TX TM 
*
rxn  
*
rmn  
0
rn  TX TM 
*
rxn  
*
rmn  
0
rn  TX TM 
200 0 23 - - - 13 23 15 9,009 6,806 16 22 16 14,541 1,552 
250 0 23 - - - 14 22 15 9,706 6,196 17 9 15 15,007 990 
300 2 23 15 75 15,180 15 22 15 10,417 5,580 17 9 15 15,457 540 
350 4 23 15 240 15,079 15 22 15 11,167 4,830 18 9 15 15,907 90 
400 5 23 15 474 14,881 16 22 16 11,933 4,160 18 0 - - - 
450 7 23 15 778 14,662 16 22 16 12,733 3,360 18 0 - - - 
500 8 23 15 1,141 14,347 17 9 15 13,297 2,700 19 0 - - - 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This research is inspired by the disruption planning practices in the public tram systems in Munich and Berlin, 
Germany, which are believed to be amongst the best in dealing with short-term disruptions. The major contributions 
of this research can be seen from three main perspectives. First, our research takes a first step in adopting a contract 
approach - a proven method in supply chain management, for building a long-term collaboration relationship between 
the tram and taxi providers for efficiently dealing with disruptions. Second, the decision functions of the two actors 
considering the passengers’ behaviors and a range of internal system elements provide a quantitative framework for 
identifying key factors affecting the decision-making situation and for obtaining important managerial implications. 
Finally, the two actors’ individual optimal decision and interactions through a negotiation process are examined, 
reinforcing the importance of collaboration for recovery service in public tram systems. This is a successful application 
of the collaborative partnership - a powerful and core concept in supply chain management, to the public transport 
systems. To our knowledge, our research is one of the first such applications in this arena.   
It is our first attempt to model the long-term collaboration strategies in tram system’s disruption recovery, and 
the limitations are as follows. First of all, the model could be extended to a stochastic one, for example, the taxis’ 
arrival time and average recovery service time, as well as the disruption frequency per year, are actually uncertain 
variables. Secondly, the passengers’ leaving rate is assumed linearly which may simplify the real situation. Thirdly, 
in the two parties’ negotiation process, the situation with competition is not studied explicitly. Finally, the tram 
company’s recovery service goal has two dimensions - the passengers’ satisfaction and the recovery costs. In the event 
of a disruption, the two dimensions may or may not be treated equally, and the decisions are essentially to balance 
these two dimensions. These limitations represent plausible directions for future research. Furthermore, it will be 
worthwhile to explore the feasibility of using combined buses and taxis as recovery service vehicles as opposed to 
taxi-only approach.   
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